Many models proposed to study the evolution of collective action rely on a formalism that represents social interactions as n-player games between individuals adopting discrete actions such as cooperate and defect. Despite the importance of spatial structure in biological collective action, the analysis of n-player games games in spatially structured populations has so far proved elusive.
.
89
Individuals implement mixed strategies, i.e., they play A with probability z (and B with probability 
probability φ k is given by a binomial distribution with parameters n − 1 and z • , i.e., φ k z 1(•) , z 2(•) , . . . , z n−1(
98
Substituting (2) into (1) and discarding second and higher order terms, we obtain
3 Games between relatives
155
We start by deriving compact expressions for the direct effect −C(z), the indirect effect B(z), and the gain 156 function G(z) in terms of the payoffs a k and b k of the game. These expressions provide the foundation for 157 our subsequent analysis.
158
Imagine a focal individual playing B in a group where k of its co-players play A. Suppose that the 159 focal switches its action to A while co-players hold fixed their actions, thus changing its payoff from b k to 160 a k . As a consequence, the focal experiences a "direct gain from switching" given by
162
At the same time, each of the co-players playing A experiences a change in payoff given by ∆a k−1 = 163 a k − a k−1 and each of the co-players playing B experiences a change in payoff given by ∆b k = b k+1 − b k .
164
Taken as a block, co-players experience a change in payoff given by 165 e k = k∆a k−1 + (n − 1 − k)∆b k , k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1,
166 where we set a −1 = b n+1 = 0. From the focal's perspective, this change in payoffs represents an "indirect 
170
in a group where k out of the n − 1 co-players play A.
171
We show in Appendix B that the direct, indirect, and net effects appearing in (4) are indeed given by
173 
177 that is, as the expected values of the relevant gains from switching when the number of co-players playing
178
A is distributed according to a binomial distribution with parameters n − 1 and z.
179
It follows from (10) that games between relatives are mathematically equivalent to transformed games between unrelated individuals, where "inclusive payoffs" take the place of standard, or personal, payoffs.
Indeed, consider a game in which A-players and B-players respectively obtain payoffs
184 185 when k co-players play A. Payoffs a k and b k can be understood as inclusive payoffs consisting of the payoff 186 obtained by a focal plus κ times the sum of the payoffs obtained by the focal's co-players. Using (6)- (7) 187 we can rewrite (8) as f k = a k − b k , so that the inclusive gains from switching are identical to the direct 188 gains from switching in a game with payoff structure given by (11) .
189
This observation has two relevant consequences. First, existing results on the evolutionarily stable 190 strategies of games between unrelated individuals (Peña et al., 2014) , which are based on the observation 191 that the right side of (10) is a polynomial in Bernstein form (Farouki, 2012) , also apply here, provided
192
that the inclusive gains from switching f k are used instead of the standard (direct) gains from switching d k
193
in the formula for the gain function, and that evolutionary stability is understood as convergence stability.
194
For a large class of games, these results allow us to identify convergence stable strategies from a direct where the payoff of the focal is augmented by adding κ times the payoff of the co-player.
201
4 The evolution of collective action
202
Let us now apply our model to the evolution of collective action. To this end, we let action A ("provide")
203
be associated with some effort in collective action, action B ("shirk") with no effort, and refer to A-players 204 as "providers" and to B-players as "shirkers". Each provider incurs a cost γ > 0 in order for a collective 205 good of value β j to be created, where j is the total number of providers. We assume that the collective 206 good fails to be created if no individual works (β 0 = 0), and that the value of the collective good β j is 207 increasing in the number of providers (∆β j = β j+1 − β j ≥ 0). We distinguish between three kinds of provides the corresponding payoffs and gains from switching.
211
Economies of scale are incorporated in the model through the properties of the production function 212 β j . We investigate three functional forms ( Fig. 2 ): (i) linear (β j = βj for some β > 0, so that ∆β j is 213 constant), (ii) decelerating (∆β j is decreasing in j), and (iii) accelerating (∆β j is increasing in j). We also 214 say that returns to scale are respectively (i) constant, (ii) diminishing, or (iii) increasing. To illustrate 215 the effects of economies of scale, we consider the "geometric production function":
217 with β > 0 and λ > 0, for which returns to scale are constant when λ = 1, decreasing when λ < 1, and 218 increasing when λ > 1 (Fig. 2) .
219
For all three kinds of collective goods, the indirect gains from switching are always nonnegative, hence 220 the indirect effect B(z) is nonnegative for all z. Consequently, participation in collective action is either 221 payoff altruistic or payoff cooperative, and the selection gradient is increasing in κ. The provision of 222 each kind of collective good however leads to a different collective action problem, as it is reflected in the 223 different payoff structures of the corresponding games (Table 1 ). In particular, while the provision of 224 charity goods is payoff altruistic for all z, the provision of public and club goods can be either payoff 225 altruistic or payoff cooperative, depending on the parameters of the game and the resident strategy z.
226
In the following, we characterize the evolutionary dynamics of each of these three kinds of collective 227 action problems and investigate the effects of (scaled) relatedness on the set of evolutionary attractors.
228
Although many of our results also extend to the case of negative relatedness, for simplicity we restrict 229 attention to nonnegative relatedness (κ ≥ 0). It will be shown that the evolutionary dynamics fall 230 into one of the following five dynamical regimes: (i) "null provision" (z = 0 is the only attractor), (ii)
231
"full provision" (z = 1 is the only attractor), (iii) "coexistence" (there is a unique singular strategy z * 232 which is attracting), (iv) "bistability" (z = 0 and z = 1 are both attracting, with a singular repeller z * 233 dividing their basins of attraction), and (v) "bistable coexistence" (z = 0 is attracting, z = 1 is repelling,
234
and there are two singular strategies z L and z R , satisfying z L < z R , such that z L is a repeller and z R 
Linear production functions

240
To isolate the effects of the kind of collective good, we begin our analysis with the case where the 241 production function takes the linear form β j = βj, i.e., λ = 1 in (12). For all three kinds of collective 242 goods, the gain function can then be written as
244
The parameter C > 0 may be thought of as the "effective cost" per co-player of joining collective action 245 alone. We have C = γ/(n − 1) when a focal provider is not among the beneficiaries of the collective 246 good (charity goods) and C = (γ − β)/(n − 1) otherwise (public and club goods). The parameter B ≥ 0 247 measures the incremental benefit accruing to each co-player of a focal provider when none of the co-players 248 joins collective action. We thus have B = 0 for club goods and B = β otherwise. Finally, D is null for 249 public goods (D = 0), positive for club goods (D = β), and negative for charity goods (D = −β).
250
Depending on the values of these parameters, we obtain the following characterization of the resulting 
there is bistability: both z = 0 and z = 1 are attractors and the singular strategy
is a repeller. 
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276
If the production function is decelerating, ∆β k is decreasing in k, implying that G(z) is decreasing in 
coexistence. With decelerating production functions, there is null provision if
bistability.
285
The effect of relatedness on the evolution of public goods provision can be better grasped by noting 286 that multiplying and dividing (14) by 1 + κ(n − 1) we obtain , 2006; Hauert et al., 2006; Pacheco et al., 2009; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011; Peña et al., 2014) .
292
Hence, the effects of relatedness can be understood as affecting only the cost of cooperation, while leaving 293 economies of scale and patterns of frequency dependence unchanged.
294
To illustrate the evolutionary dynamics of public goods games, consider a geometric production 295 function (12) with λ = 1 (see Table 2 for a summary of the results and Appendix C for a derivation). We 296 find that there are two critical cost-to-benefit ratios:
298
such that for small costs (γ/β ≤ ε) there is full provision and for large costs (γ/β ≥ ϑ) there is null 299
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301 such that there is coexistence if returns to scale are diminishing (λ < 1) and bistability if returns to scale 302 are increasing (λ > 1). For a given cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β, higher relatedness makes the region in the 303 parameter space where cooperation (resp. defection) dominates larger (resp. smaller). Moreover, z * is an 304 increasing (resp. decreasing) function of κ when λ < 1 (resp. λ > 1), meaning that the proportion of 305 providers at the internal attractor (resp. the size of the basin of attraction of z = 1) is larger for higher κ
306
( Fig. 3 .a and 3.d ). 
316
If the production function is decelerating, the indirect gains from switching e k may still be increasing 317 in k because the incremental benefit ∆β k accrues to a larger number of recipients as k increases. In such 318 a scenario, always applicable when n = 2, the evolutionary dynamics are again qualitatively identical 319 to those arising when economies of scale are absent. A different picture emerges if the number of 320 players is greater than two and returns to scale are diminishing. In this case, B(z) can be negative 321 frequency-dependent for some z, and hence (for sufficiently high values of κ) so can be G(z). Depending 322 on the value of relatedness, which modulates how the frequency dependence of B(z) interacts with that of 323 C(z), and on the particular shape of the production function, this can give rise to evolutionary dynamics 324 different from those discussed in Section 4.1. In particular, bistable coexistence is possible.
325
As an example, consider the geometric production function (12) with λ = 1 (see Table 2 for a summary
326
of results and Appendix D.2 for proofs). Defining the critical returns-to-scale value
328
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330 which satisfy ξ < 1 and ς < τ , our result can be stated as follows. For λ ≥ ξ the evolutionary dynamics 331 depends on how the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β compares to 1 and to ς. If γ/β ≤ 1 (low costs), there is full 
340
The critical values ξ, ς, and τ are all increasing functions of κ ≥ 0. Hence, with larger relatedness κ, 
Charity goods with accelerating and decelerating production functions
348
For charity goods the direct gains from switching d k (cf. Table 1 ) are always decreasing in k, so that the 349 direct effect −C(z) is negative frequency-dependent.
350
From the formulas given in Table 1 , it is clear that the direct gains from switching d k are always 
358
If the production function is accelerating, the indirect gains from switching e k may still be decreasing in 359 k because the incremental benefit ∆β k accrues to a smaller number of recipients (n − 1 − k) as k increases. 
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369 and on the two critical cost-to-benefit ratios 370 ζ = κ(n − 1), and
371 which satisfy > 1 and ζ < η.
372
With these definitions our results can be stated as follows. For λ ≤ the dynamical outcome depends nonprovision. This is so because ζ and η are increasing functions of κ, and is a decreasing function of κ.
goods games with geometric benefits can be used to recover Results 1, 2, and 3 of Eshel and Motro (1988) .
Finally, Van Cleve and Lehmann (2013) discuss an n-player coordination game. They assume payoffs
428
given by a k = 1 + S(R/S) k/(n−1) and b k = 1 + P (T /P ) k/(n−1) , for positive R, S, T , and P , satisfying 429 R > T , P > S and P > T . It is easy to check that both the direct effect −C(z) and the indirect effect We extended these models to the more general case of spatially structured populations by integrating 446 them into the direct fitness approach of kin selection theory (Taylor and Frank, 1996; Rousset, 2004; 447 Lehmann and Rousset, 2010; Van Cleve, 2015) . We showed that convergence stable strategies for games 
453
We applied these general results to the evolution of collective action under different assumptions on 454 the kind of collective good and its economies of scale, thereby unifying and extending previous analyses.
455
We considered three kinds of collective goods, illustrative of different kinds of helping traits in nature.
456
Firstly, public goods (both providers and shirkers have access to the good) for which the collective action 457 problem is the well known free-rider problem (i.e., shirkers are cheaters who benefit from the good without 458 helping to create it). Secondly, club goods (only providers have access to the good) for which there is no 459
17
. 4, 2014; a risky collective activity). Thirdly, charity goods (only shirkers use the good) for which the collective 461 action problem takes the form of an altruism problem (i.e., individuals would prefer to enjoy the collective 462 good rather than provide it for others).
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463
We showed that relatedness can help solving each of these collective action problems, but that such We assumed that the actions implemented by players are discrete. This is in contrast to standard 506 models of games between relatives, which assume a continuum of pure actions in the form of continuous 507 amounts of effort devoted to some social activity. Such continuous-action models have the advantage that 508 fitness or payoff functions (the counterparts to (3)) can be assumed to take simple forms that facilitate 509 mathematical analysis. On the other hand, there are situations where individuals can express only few 510 morphs (e.g., worker and queen in the eusocial Hymenoptera; Wheeler 1986), behavioral tactics (e.g.,
511
"producers" and "scroungers" in Passer domesticus; Barnard and Sibly 1981) or phenotypic states (e.g., being said, we expect our qualitative results about the interaction between kind of good, economies of 515 scale, and relatedness to carry over to continuous-action models.
516
We assumed that the number of interacting individuals n is constant. However, changes in density 517 will inevitably lead to fluctuating group sizes, with low densities resulting in small group sizes and high 518 densities resulting in large group sizes. It is clear from the dependence of the critical cost-to-benefit ratios 519 and the critical returns-to-scale parameters on group size (Table 2) that the effects of varying group sizes 520 on the evolutionary dynamics of collective action will critically depend on the the kind of good and its 521 economies of scale. It would be interesting to integrate this phenomenon into our model, thus extending 522 previous work on the effects of group size in the evolution of helping (Motro, 1991; Brännström et al., 
536
Collective action problems in nature are likely to be more diverse than the usually assumed model of 537 public goods provision with constant returns to scale. Given the local demographic structure of biological 538 populations, interactions between relatives are also likely to be the rule rather than the exception.
539
Empirical work on the evolution of altruism and cooperation should thus aim at measuring the relatedness 540 of interactants, the kind of good, and the associated economies of scale, as it is the interaction between 541 these three factors which will determine the evolutionary dynamics of collective action in real biological 542 systems. parent to the total number of ways of sampling two offspring:
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which holds for any neutral growth process.
583
We now consider three different cases: 
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606
Recalling the definitions of C(z) and B(z) from (4) as well as the definitions of d k and e k from (6)- (7) 607 we need to show
where the function π has been defined in (3). (B.1) follows directly by taking the partial derivative of π 612 with respect to z • and evaluating at z • = z • = z, so it remains to establish (B.2).
613
Our derivation of (B.2) uses properties of polynomials in Bernstein form. Such polynomials, which in 614 general can be written as
Applying this property to (3) and evaluating the resulting partial derivative at z
In order to obtain (B.2) from (B.3) it then suffices to establish
as applying these identities to the terms on the right side of (B.3) yields the right side of (B.2).
625
Let us prove (B.4) ((B.5) is proven in a similar way). Starting from the left side of (B.4), we multiply 626 and divide by m/(k + 1) and distribute x to obtain
Applying the identity r k = r k r−1 k−1 and changing the index of summation to k = k + 1, we get
Finally, changing the lower index of the sum by noting that the summand is zero when k = 0 gives (B.4).
631
C Public goods games with geometric production function
632
For a geometric production function, we have ∆β k = βλ k , so that the inclusive gains from switching for 633 public goods games are given by
Substituting this expression into (10) and 634 using the formula for the probability generating function of a binomial random variable, we obtain
As G(z) is either decreasing (λ < 1) or increasing (λ > 1) in z, A (resp. B) is a dominant strategy if For club goods games, the inclusive gains from switching are given by
D.1 Accelerating production function
644
In the case where the production function is accelerating, we have the following general result. For a geometric production function, we obtain the following result.
660
Result 2 (Club goods games with geometric production function). Let f k be given by (D.1) with β k
661
given by (12). Also, let κ ≥ 0 and n > 2 (the cases κ < 0 or n = 2 are trivial). Moreover, let ξ, ς and τ 662 be defined by (18) and (19). Then
is the only convergence stable strategy (full provision).
665
(b) If 1 < γ/β < ς, both z = 0 and z = 1 are convergence stable and there is a unique convergence 666 unstable strategy z * ∈ (0, 1) (bistability).
667
(c) If γ/β ≥ ς, z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision). unstable strategy z * ∈ (0,ẑ) (bistability).
672
(c) If ς < γ/β < τ , there are two singular strategies z L and z R satisfying 0 < z L <ẑ < z R < 1.
673
The strategies z = 0 and z R are convergence stable, whereas z L and z = 1 are convergence 674 unstable (bistable coexistence).
675
(d) If γ/β ≥ τ , z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).
676
Observing that ξ < 1 holds and ignoring the trivial case λ = 1, there are three cases to consider: (i) 677 λ > 1, (ii) 1 > λ ≥ ξ, and (iii) ξ > λ.
678
For λ > 1 the production function is accelerating and hence Result 1 applies with β 1 = β and 679 β n + κ(n − 1)∆β n−1 = βς. This yields Result 2.1 for the case λ > 1.
680
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For λ < 1, the sequence ∆f k is decreasing in k and hence can have at most one sign change. Moreover,
686
as ∆f 0 = βλ(1 + κ) > 0 always holds true, the initial sign of ∆f k is positive and whether or not the 687 sequence ∆f k has a sign change depends solely on how ∆f n−2 compares to zero. Observe, too, that for 688 λ < 1 we have ς > 1 as λ n < λ holds.
689
Consider the case ξ ≤ λ < 1. By the definition of ξ (18) this implies ∆f n−2 ≥ 0. In this case ∆f k 690 has no sign changes and f k is nondecreasing. The sign pattern of the inclusive gain sequence can then 691 be determined by looking at how the signs of its endpoints depend on the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β. If 
696
For λ < ξ we have ∆f n−2 < 0, implying that ∆f k has one sign change from + to −, i.e., f k is 697 unimodal. Hence, the gain function G(z) is also unimodal (Peña et al., 2014, Section 3.4. 3) with modeẑ 698 determined by G (ẑ) = 0. Using the assumption of geometric benefits, we can express G(z) is closed form
with corresponding derivative 
(a) If γ/β < ζ, both z = 0 and z = 1 are convergence unstable and there is a unique convergence stable strategy z * ∈ (0, 1) (coexistence).
(b) If γ/β ≥ ζ, z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).
(a) If γ/β ≤ ζ, both z = 0 and z = 1 are convergence unstable and there is a unique convergence 740 stable strategyẑ < z * < 1 (coexistence).
741
(b) If ζ < γ/β < η, there are two singular strategies z L and z R satisfying 0 < z L <ẑ < z R < 1.
742
The strategies z = 0 and z R are convergence stable, whereas z L and z = 1 are convergence 743 unstable (bistable coexistence).
744
(c) If γ/β ≥ η, then z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).
745
The arguments used for deriving this result are analogous to those used for deriving the results for holds for κ ≥ 0 and that the case λ = 1 (constant returns to scale) is trivial, we can prove this result by 748 considering three cases: (i) λ < 1, (ii) 1 < λ ≤ , and (iii) < λ.
749
For λ < 1, the production function is decelerating and hence Result 3 applies with ∆β 0 = β. Recalling 750 the definition of ζ = κ(n − 1) from (21) and rearranging, this yields Result 4.1 for the case λ ≤ 1 < .
751
To obtain the result for the remaining two cases, we calculate the first and second forward differences 752 of the benefit sequence (12) and substitute them into
For λ > 1, the sequence ∆f k is decreasing in k and hence can have at most one sign change. Moreover, 757 since ∆f n−2 = −βλ n−2 (1 + κ) < 0 always holds true, the sign pattern of ∆f k depends exclusively on For λ > we have ∆f 0 > 0, implying that ∆f k has one sign change from + to −, i.e., f k is unimodal.
This implies that the gain function G(z) is also unimodal with its modeẑ being determined by G (ẑ) = 0
767
( Peña et al., 2014, Section 3.4.3) . Using the assumption of geometric benefits, we can express G(z) in 768 closed form as
with corresponding derivative given by
786
For this payoff constellation, it is straightforward to obtain the indirect benefits B(z) from (B.3) in 787 Appendix B. Indeed, observing that ∆a k = ∆b k = ∆β k holds for all k, we have
Using (9a) and the fact that a k − b k = −γ, we have that the direct benefit is given by −C(z) = −γ.
790
29
If κ ≤ 0, our assumption that the production function β k is increasing implies that G(z) is always 793 negative, so that z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).
794
To analyze the case where κ ≥ 0, it is convenient to observe that (F.1) is of a similar form as (14).
795
The only differences are that the summation in (F.1) extends from 0 to n − 2 (rather than to n − 1) and 796 that the term multiplying the incremental benefit ∆β k is given by κ(n − 1) (rather than by 1 + κ(n − 1)).
797
All the results obtained for public goods games can thus be easily translated to the case of other-only 798 goods games. is bistability.
807
If the production function is geometric (12), the gain function is given by
so that, for λ = 1, the evolutionary dynamics are similar to the case of public goods games after redefining 810 the critical cost-to-benefit ratios as 811 ε = min κ(n − 1), λ n−2 κ(n − 1) and ϑ = max κ(n − 1), λ n−2 κ(n − 1) Providers (e.g., vigilants, cooperative hunters, or sterile workers) work together to create a collective good (e.g., alarm calls, increased hunting success, or nest defense), which can be used exclusively by a subset of individuals in the group (filled circles). Shirkers do not make any effort in collective action. a, Public goods (both providers and shirkers use the good). b, Club goods (only providers use the good). c, Charity goods (only shirkers use the good).
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inclusive gains (f k ) public −γ + β k+1 β k −γ +∆β k (n−1)∆β k −γ +(1 + κ(n−1))∆β k club −γ + β k+1 0 −γ +β k+1 k∆β k −γ +β k+1 +κk∆β k charity −γ β k −γ −β k (n−1−k)∆β k −γ −β k +κ(n−1−k)∆β k Table 1 : Payoff structures and gains from switching for the three classes of collective action problems. In each case providers incur a cost γ > 0 to create a collective good of value β j ≥ 0, where j is the number of providers in the group. The number of providers experienced by a focal is j = k if the focal is a shirker (action B), and j = k + 1 if it is a provider (action A). Direct gains (d k ) and indirect gains (e k ) are calculated by substituting the formulas for a k and b k into (6) and (7). Inclusive gains from switching (f k ) are then obtained from (8).
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. CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a The copyright holder for this preprint (which was . http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/012229 doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Dec. 4, 2014;  public goods λ < 1 λ > 1 γ/β ≤ ε full provision γ/β ≤ ε full provision ε < γ/β < ϑ coexistence ε < γ/β < ϑ bistability γ/β ≥ ϑ null provision γ/β ≥ ϑ null provision club goods λ < 1/ λ ≥ 1/ γ/β ≤ 1 full provision γ/β ≤ 1 full provision 1 < γ/β < ς bistability 1 < γ/β < ς bistability ς ≤ γ/β < τ bistable coexistence γ/β ≥ ς null provision γ/β ≥ τ null provision charity goods λ ≤ λ > γ/β < ζ coexistence γ/β < ζ coexistence γ/β ≥ ζ null provision ζ ≤ γ/β < η bistable coexistence γ/β ≥ η null provision Table 2 : Dynamical regimes of collective action for the case of geometric production functions. The dynamical outcome depends on the type of good, the magnitude of the returns-to-scale parameter λ, and the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β. The results hold for κ ≥ 0 and n > 2. The critical cost-to-benefit ratios are given by ζ = κ(n − 1), ε = min(1 + ζ, λ n−1 (1 + ζ)), ϑ = max(1 + ζ, λ n−1 (1 + ζ)), η = [1/(λ − 1)] 1 + λκ [(n − 2)λκ/(1 + ζ)] n−2 , ς = (1 − λ n )/(1 − λ) + ζλ n−1 , τ = [1/(1 − λ)] 1 + λκ [(n − 2)κ/(1 + ζ)] n−2 . The critical returns-to-scale parameters are ξ = κ(n − 2)/[1 + κ(n − 1)] and = 1/ξ.
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